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Glenn Barenthins' book was published in a Bloomsbury series Scientific Studies of Religion: Inquiry and Explanation, which mostly included titles authored by researchers from the so-called Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). Glenn Barenthin is neither a scholar of religion nor is his book primarily focused on religion. He is a professor of Justice Studies at the University of Guelph-Humber, Canada, and the objective of his book is human cooperation in general. The link to CSR comes from the fact that his argumentation stems from a critique of a theory of religion which tries to explain large scale cooperation in human societies.
Human cooperation is a scientific puzzle that attracts the attention of researchers from disciplines ranging from biology and psychology to economy, social anthropology, and religious studies. Cooperation interests us because defectors should evolutionarily out-compete cooperators, and cooperation should cease (the free-rider problem). Cooperation is a stable strategy as far as it happens among close kin (or potential mates) or if it is tied to direct reciprocity, but these cases do not explain the extensive forms of human cooperation. Several mechanisms have been identified which can facilitate stable cooperation beyond kin and without direct reciprocity (indirect reciprocity or altruistic punishment) (Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Ensminger, Henrich, 2014) . However, most of them work primarily in small-scale, hunter-gatherer like societies.
So how can human beings work together to such an extent as to build and maintain largescale states and civilizations? One proposed explanation tries to find the answer in religion. In the last 10 -15 years, an increasing number of researchers in the so-called Cognitive Science of Religion started to challenge the standard cognitive model of religion, according to which religion is a by-product of cognitive capacities evolved for different functions, arguing that religions have an adaptive function as it enhances cooperation beyond kin and ingroup members. One branch of this movement proposes a theory which links beliefs in Moralizing or Big Gods and human cooperation. These researchers argue that belief in a watching and punishing moralizing god makes people more willing to cooperate with strangers. Religions based on beliefs in these Big Gods are interpreted as prosocial in the way they demand hard to fake loyalty displays, and therefore facilitate cooperation within large groups of strangers. Belief in watching and puni shing Gods should reduce moral transgression and hence lead to more cohesive groups, which enables them to scale up.
Glen Barenthin builds his theory of cooperation on criticism of, as he calls them, the Big God Proponents (BGP). Most notably, but not exclusively he refers to the work of Ara Norezayan and Dominik Johnson, summarized in their relatively recent books (Norenzayan, 2013; Johnson, 2016) , which gained large popularity. In the plethora of objections against the Moralizing Gods Theory, Barenthin makes three crucial ones. First, the BGP base their theory on so-called cultural group selection claiming that more cooperative groups out-compete less cooperative groups. Therefore prosocial religious groups with moralizing Gods were favoured, and this is why most human societies today are either based on or are the cultural descendants of these highly successful prosocial religions. Cultural group selection is however, rather problematic and more a hypothesis than a proven fact on which to build a theory. Second, the BGP have based a significant portion of their claims on experimental priming studies. Barenthin argues that the priming technique has many methodological flaws, and results of these studies bring little support for the theory, while other priming studies bring counterevidence. In a short overview of priming studies, Barenthin shows that the evidence is rather ambiguous.
The third objection, and I think the most important, relates to the BGP claim that beliefs in moralizing and punishing gods cause societies to scale up, and were the cause for a shift from small-scale hunter-gatherer societies to more complex societies based on the cooperation of strangers. Barenthin argues that BGP are blind to historical evidence while they fail to distinguish between cooperation and coercion. In most of human history, after the shift from hunter-gatherer to more complex so -cieties, humans lived in societies organized and governed by coercive elite groups that monopolized violence ("natural states"). This is a crucial remark because it dissolves the exclusive and straightforward connection between cooperation and society's size which can be scaled-up by coercion.
Glenn Barenthin builds his argument on knowledge from anthropology, cognitive sciences, psychology, and game theory, which is, in most cases, well known in the cooperation literature. However, enriched with historical evidence he uses it in a new and fresh way and puts forth his theory of cooperation, which hinges on two different types of cooperation.
(1) in cooperation, which describes a type of cooperation that rises from our cognitive and emotional equipment, and which is an evolutionary adaptation to our lives in small scale hunter-gatherer societies. It is based on our intuitive motivations to cooperate first with kin and then with in-group members and in specific con ditions with strangers. (2) ick cooperation, which describes open cooperation with strangers, on the contrary, based on reasoning, argumentation, and reflective thinking and is linked to the ideas of individual autonomy and human rights. According to Barenthin this type of cooperation did not emerge and had not become a society shaping force until the last few centuries. Contrary to BGP's Barenthin claims that big and complex societies do not require a form of cooperation which is based on willingness to extensive cooperation with strangers. Intuitive in cooperation leads to both small scale egalitarian societies, but also large scale internally hierarchized "natural states". Barenthin's theory addresses the same issues of cooperation, as the Big Gods eory and tries to explain the very existence of large-scale societies, but without the need for beliefs in moralizing gods as a motivator for prosocial behaviour.
I am pretty sure that this book will start intense discussion with adaptionists in CSR and I am a bit disappointed that Glenn Barenthin confronts his ideas only with BGP, but another adaptionist branch of the CSR, which focuses on the prosocial and cooperation enhancing functions of collective rituals, was not even touched in this book. Despite that, this book is a much-needed and robust contribution to the debate about the origins of human cooperation. Juraj Franek wrote an inspiring, if somewhat provocative (which is by no means a downgrading quality!) book that deserves attention from scholars with a sincere interest in the science of religion -its history, philosophical underpinnings, and the resulting theoretical, metho -dological, and personal consequences. More specifically, the book looks at two "incompatible" approaches, namely protectionism and naturalism, in religious research and analyses their historical context and implications for the broader academic study of religion. In doing so, it engages in a necessary discussion regarding the intersection of ideological motivations and research agendas. Quite pleasingly, the author opens with a discussion of Raphael's Transfiguration, where he brings forward one particular interpretation that sees the painting as capturing the irreconcilable opposition of reason and faith, or the submission of the human to the divine. As he shows throughout the book, this is one of protectionism's central tenets -defending the faith against reason and science. Naturalism, as the main "adversary" to this paradigm, tries instead to explain, as opposed to just describing, or understanding, religion. To this end, it reduces religion to analysable (psychological, social) elements that are themselves not religious per se -a truly desecrating exercise for some protectionists! Both traditions have deep historical rootsin Greek philosophy (naturalism) and early Christian philosophy (protectionism), respectively. As the author rightfully points out, far too often are these ancient sources left out from accounts of religious studies' history, which tend to commence with the early modern era. On the other hand, Franek could have devoted himself some extra space to draw explicit parallels between the past and the novel ideas, both of which he discusses at length. To be more specific, a lot of the classic authors in the anthropology of religion that he presents (Malinowski, Durkheim, Freud, Tylor 2 ) worked on ideas resembling those of the ancient philosophers (Xenophanes, Demokritos, Prodikos) introduced earlier on. The book would have benefited from a more explicit cross-referencing between both groups. Also, Franek could have exemplified the stated continuity in some current Cognitive science of religion (CSR) scholarship in a nutshell: -e.g., the Sisyphean frag-ment (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Adversus mathematicos 9.54 = DK 88 B 25) sounds a lot like Norenzayan's Big Gods' hypothesis (Norenzayan, 2013) . This fragment shows how antique the original idea is and could have been included in support of the book's central argument in the later CSR section.
Nevertheless, Franek's notable contribution lies in his coming up with a distinguishing criterion between the naturalistic and the protectionist paradigm, related to what he calls epistemic justification. Whereas the former uses per rem justification, meaning that the truthfulness value of the proposition lies in the proposition's very quality as being true, which is bound by the factual state of the world, the latter uses per hominem argumentation, where the truthfulness derives from the authority or quality of the messenger.
Franek's revealing analysis shows some more or less persuasive techniques used by protectionists to make their case. These were miracles, moral superiority, or prophecies in early Christianity, or their methodological substitutes developed later on in the phenomenological tradition and the sui generis approach to religion as a subject of study.
The author concludes that the protectionist paradigm is thus a priori non-scientific, as it compromises scientific truths for "higher" religious truths, which ought to be revealed, mediated, and even defended.
In a way, Franek's analysis represents a different take on the broader debate concerning the positivism -postmodernism divide in academia, this time through the perspective of epistemic justification in the area of religious studies. He diachronically presents relevant scholarship and assigns it to either camp according to said epistemic criterion. The reader can learn that after the early evolutionism and functionalism and before the recent establishment of the CSR, protectionism dominated for the better part of the 20 th century in religious studies (especially in the form of phenomenology). Franek illustrates a somewhat similar development in post-WWII anthropology in what he calls the standard model of social sciences which views culture as a sui generis phenomenon that is not reducible to a lower level of explanation. However, he omits one crucial difference between the situation in religious studies and anthropology. Whereas protectionism was used in the former case to defend and celebrate the scholars' own cultural (religious) beliefs, anthropologists have often applied the sui generis approach to preserve and idealize native cultures and cultural diversity (Mead, 1928; Sahlins, 1968) .
Another crucial issue debated in the book is the definition of religion. Franek is correct in pointing out that such an endeavour has broad political and legal ramifications. Human rights (including cultural group rights), taxation of churches, or the constitutional right to the freedom of belief are all dependent on the demarcation of the subject of religion. The author quite scathingly proposes that it is fair and square to do "science for science", and have our academic disagreements, but whom if not religious scholars should moderate the (legal, political, public) debate on the subject and confine it? A strong point, even though a quick reference could have been made to the body of literature dealing with this problem (e.g., Mahmood, 2016; Patel, 2012; Seligman, Weller, 2012; Shah, Friedman, 2017) .
The naturalistic paradigm of the CSR seems to have dealt with the definitional issue fairly satisfyingly, even if not utterly, Franek admits. The cognitivists have resurrected Tylor's minimal definition of religion as the belief in supernatural beings; however, they operationalized it to make it suitable for scientific and experimental research -hence the use of the concept of minimally counterintuitive agents instead (MCI). Franek believes that in combination with scientific rigor, this terminological shift can defend CSR from potential ideological and political influences. Frankly, it is a bit surprising that he does not address the elephant in the room at this point, which is research funding. It is a "public secret" so to speak that some big grant agencies have their agendas, which they are pushing through the funding of projects fitting these agendas (CSR included). In consequence, an imbalance in the field emerges where some lines of inquiry are developed at the cost of other potential research directions or topics. Hence, CSR is far from immune from the said influences, contrary to what the author would like us to believe.
Another issue with the minimal definition of religion is what Franek previously hinted at but did not address more extensively, which is the lack of consensus about the definitional criteria within CSR. First, the MCI concept is itself insufficient in explaining why a particular belief would count as a religious belief -this has been formulated as the Santa Claus problem (Barrett, 2008) 3 . Second, a growing body of research within and outside of CSR is showing how vital the contextual and external factors are in spreading cultural representations, exposing the limits of a purely cognitive account -examples would be CREDs theory developed by cultural evolutionists (Henrich, 2009 ), or Costly signalling theory developed by behavioural ecologists (Sosis, 2000; 2003; Sosis, Bulbulia, 2011) . Third, some scholars in CSR are asserting a more holistic view of religion as an adaptive complex, applying system theory to capture the connections of its constituent parts. The adaptationists would undoubtedly count as naturalists, yet their method goes beyond pure reductionism (Lang, Kundt, in print; Sosis, 2017 Sosis, , 2019a Sosis, , 2019b .
Last, but not least, Franek reminds us that there is a causal connection between scholars' own (un)beliefs and their "affiliation" with either protectionism or naturalism. At the same time, he very critically inspects the "declaration of neutrality" on the part of the CSR scholars, who are trying to avoid commenting on religious truths, performing what he calls a "deistic charade". Franek indicates that ultimately, faith is incompatible with the scientific approach as it goes against the principle of Ockham's razor -if there is a naturalistic explanation of the world which respects the laws of physics, then there is no place for an additional metaphysical alternative. Whether you agree or not, this book is the right place for starting the dialogue. The book presents a collection of texts on concrete healing practices as well as reflexions on the understanding of ICH. Some authors are practitioners of traditional medicine, while others are ethnographers who conducted research in selected communities. Individual chapters interpret ethnographic data and many authors use anthropological concepts. Thus, this publication illustrates how ethnographic research can be applied in cultural policy. All authors address a relationship between biomedicine and traditional medicine which is considered as one of the main factors influencing the change of traditional knowledge. In my review, I will focus on this aspect of safeguarding traditional healing practices and will link it to anthropological works.
While UNESCO documents speak about "healing practices" and "healing knowledge", the editors of the book prefer the term "traditional medicine". The reason is that this notion can serve as a general category which includes not only the practices themselves, but also associated rituals, material objects, and experience of practitioners; it also embraces traditional crafts, social relations and oral traditions. Thus, the book places healing in a broader cultural and social context and aims to give readers "a taste of the rich diversity that can be found in traditional medicine practices" (Falk, 2017: 3) . The introductory chapter on the concept of ICH starts with a statement that perceptions of physical and psychological wellbeing differ substantially across and within societies and that cultural practices designed for well-being purposes are embodied in cultural systems of value (Napier, Ancarno, Butler, Calabrese, Chater, Chatterjee, 2014 , as quoted in Scounti, 2017 . Overall, the book accentuates the role of community in traditional medicine. The main ideas of the book therefore correspond to two theoretical notions of medical anthropology: (1) medical or ethno-medical system, usually understood as a community's ideas and practices related to illness and health, which exist in particular cultural settings; and (2) the concept of medical pluralism -the existence of different medical systems within one society (Pool, Wenzel, 2005: 39-40) .
e book also addresses the complementary character of non-biomedical healing and therefore refers to the concept of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) -health-related practices that do not fit within the dominant biomedical model of health care, do not conform to its standards and are not commonly available within the official health system (Harris, Rees, 2000; Furnham, Vincent, 2000) . e aim of the book is not to make conclusions about the validity of traditional medicine from a biomedical point of view. e authors presume that traditional medicine should coexist with modern medicine and complement it, and this idea is stated already in the foreword: "Traditional medicine plays an important role as a means of treatment for people outside the reach of modern medicine. It also gives new hope to those suffering from diseases that modern medicine cannot yet cure" (Huh, 2017) . is argument parallels the idea of the integrative medicine which results from the incorporation of concepts, values, and practices from alternative, complementary, and conventional medicines (Barrett, Marchand, Scheder, Plane, 2003) .
However, the integration of traditional medicine and biomedicine remains difficult, if we consider traditional medicine as a general category and do not pay attention to the compatibility of particular cultural practices and the normative scope of scientific discourse. While such "nature-related" healing as herbal medicine can be a part of pharmaceutics, super -natural beliefs and magic rituals are not that unproblematic from the biomedical perspective. The book emphasizes the holistic nature of traditional medicine; and its "natural" components (such as herbs, the most frequent theme of the Traditional Medicine) are placed in a broader cultural context, including links to religious or, in general, supernatural beliefs. Yet an uneasy relationship between biomedicine and traditional healing practices follows precisely from the fact that the latter are based on different premises and typically include supernatural concepts. This contradiction has been frequently addressed by anthropologists.
During an earlier period, anthropologists' interpretations were firmly rooted in western science; "primitive" beliefs related to health and illness were linked to magic and religion, considered as earlier stages of the development of human thought. Later, in British functionalism, ethno-medicine became part of a broader perspective where traditional practices were viewed as contributing to social stability and well-being. In the most important functionalist works on this matter William H. R. Rivers (1924) and Edward Evans-Pritchard (1937) argued that indigenous medicines, which might seem irrational to Westerners, were rational when placed in the wider context of local beliefs and culture. In American anthropology similar ideas, although supported by different theoretical arguments, could be found in the works of Franz Boas and subsequently in psychological anthropology paying attention mainly to psychological disorders (see, for instance, Boas, 1940; Benedict, 1934; Devereux, 1980) . Overall, anthropological research demonstrated that the "primitive" medicine was part of complex cultural systems of knowledge -although the primacy of western (scientific) medicine over traditional healing practices was not doubted.
The assumption about the superiority of science over spirituality as well as the western attitude towards traditional knowledge have changed with the end of colonial empires and the rise of national liberation movements in the third world, when modern science based on the Enlightenment values started to be linked to colonialism and oppression (Herman, 1997: 364-365) . In anthropology, the positive shift toward traditional healing was reflected in many works, starting with Lévi-Strauss' landmark articles "Sorcerer and his magic" (1949) and "Effectiveness of Symbols" (1949) (Lévi-Strauss, 1963) . This trend was reinforced by an influential perspective of cultural relativism the main ideas of which were formulated by Boas already at the end of the 19 th century (Boas, 1887) . The relativistic position meant that one should not evaluate, but only try to understand traditional medicine, which should only be analysed as a system of thought in a specific social context, unlike the universalistic field of biomedicine, based on scientific assessment (Kleinman, 1981; Good, 1994) .
Medical anthropology as a specific field of research emerged in the post-war period on the basis of classical anthropological works, but also under the influence of the international public health movement. Thus, it makes use of a number of theoretical perspectives, some of them belonging to natural sciences and others more on the side of relativistic approach (Pool, Wenzel, 2005: 38) . In anthropological descriptions of heterogeneous healing practices there was always a distinction between biomedicine and traditional medicine. Most of them are based on taxonomy and typology: they place practitioners into categories and make dualistic classifications, such as medicine versus ethnomedicine, naturalistic versus personalistic etc. A more dynamic approach "takes into account the balance of power paralleling the complex hierarchies of legitimacy with its changing definitions reflecting the strategic practices of legitimation" (Fassin, Fassin, 1988: 353; see also MacCormack, 1981; Lindquist, 2006) . As Didier Fassin and Eric Fassin point out, the state provides a jurisdiction dividing healing practices into authorized and unauthorized. The official system relies on the same corpus of knowledge, while unofficial practices are not institutionalized and therefore are rather diverse. The study of medical systems in terms of legitimacy helps to identify "the language of society itself: although categorization may mix together practices of different natures, it is an accurate description or reflection of social forces, as they all belong to the same social field. It also proves useful since it includes the struggles of power and change in the analysis, as healers search for new sources of legitimation" (Fassin, Fassin, 1988: 353-354) .
I believe that this direction of anthropological research is much more helpful in safeguarding traditional medicine than positively laden descriptions of traditional practices which try to make them compatible with the official system of health care and in this process can adjust them, putting emphasis on their "suitable" features and leaving aside "unsuitable" ones. The study of unofficial healers' legitimation strategies reflects the dynamic nature of medical systems which could not remain unchanged because societies inevitably change; and at the same time, it can provide useful hints for cultural policy oriented on safeguarding ICH.
e appearance of the book Traditional Medicine should also be placed in the global context of the dynamic changes of medical systems and their legitimacy -not only in terms of official institutions, but also in terms of the use of unofficial healing methods by patients. It has oen been argued that in western societies popular dissatisfaction with biomedicine has increased (Bakx, 1991; Harris, Rees, 2000) . Research has shown that the popular view on CAM is characterized by four main themes contrasting it with conventional medicine: holism, empowerment, access, and legitimacy. e popularity of CAM leads to the emergence of conceptual frameworks that include many terms from nonwestern traditional medical systems (Barrett, Marchand, Scheder, Plane, 2003 ; see also Bishop, Yardley, Lewith, 2007) . It is important to notice that the public interest in the journal #Heri -tageAlive increased aer a topic of traditional medicine was announced in a call for papers, and the idea of the book on this topic was a result of this amplified attention toward traditional healing methods (Falk, 2017: 3) .
The book Traditional Medicine. Sharing Experience from the Field is excellent reading for all who are interested in medical anthropology and cultural traditions. From my point of view, the main contribution of this publication is ethnographic material which can be used in further exploration of the development of medical systems and, importantly, in understanding different attitudes of healers and patients toward well-being and healing. I believe that further research on legitimation strategies of users and practitioners of traditional medicine would greatly contribute to the process of inte-gration between traditional and conventional healing practices and at the same time would help to better describe the development of traditional medical systems of knowledge.
